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We present laboratory experiments of ¯ve di®erent multi-unit auction mechanisms.
Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned o® among two bidders with °at
demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and
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as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed{bid auction.
Furthermore, we compare the ¯ve mechanisms with respect to the e±cient allocation
of the units.
Keywords: Multi{Unit Auctions, Demand Reduction, Experimental Economics.
JEL classi¯cation: D44, C91.
¤We thank Michal Bresky, Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, David Reiley, John Kagel, Georg NÄ oldeke, Bob
Sherman, and Katerina Sherstyuk as well as seminar participants at Barcelona (ESA), Lausanne (ESEM),
Berlin, Bielefeld, St. Gallen, UCL, and Nottingham for helpful comments and suggestions and Daniel Reding
for valuable research assistance. Financial Support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, through
SFB 373 (\Quanti¯kation und Simulation Ä Okonomischer Prozesse"), Humboldt-UniversitÄ at zu Berlin, and
through grant number EN459/1-1 is gratefully acknowledged. Part of this research was conducted while
Dirk Engelmann visited the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich. The
hospitality of this institution is gratefully acknowledged.
yDepartment of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, United
Kingdom, dirk.engelmann@rhul.ac.uk
zUniversity of Cologne, Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, D-50923 KÄ oln, Ger-
many, vgrimm@uni-koeln.de
11 Introduction
Motivated by high pro¯le auctions such as the FCC or the Treasury bill auctions, theoretical
research has recently been extended from single to multi-unit auctions. Friedman (1960)
proposed to change the rules of the Treasury bill auctions from a discriminatory to a
uniform{price format which was thought by some authors to be a generalization of the
incentive compatible Vickrey auction to the multi-unit case. Vickrey (1961), however, has
already indicated that this is not the case. In the uniform{price auction any bidder has
an incentive to reduce demand on all except for the ¯rst unit, since one of his bids may
determine the price he has to pay for inframarginal units. A formal proof was provided more
recently by Ausubel and Cramton (2002) who, moreover, showed that in many cases the
discriminatory auction outperforms the uniform-price auction. Similarly, Katzman (1995),
Noussair (1995), Engelbrecht{Wiggans and Kahn (1998), and Grimm et al. (2003) analyze
auctions where bidders have demand for multiple units and give examples of equilibria that
involve demand reduction.
A sealed{bid mechanism that generalizes the Vickrey auction for single units to the
multi-unit case has already been presented in Vickrey (1961). It is basically a special
case of the revelation mechanisms developed independently by Clarke (1971) and Groves
(1973). Ausubel (2004) proposed an open auction that implements the outcome of the
(incentive compatible) multi{unit Vickrey auction in a way that is possibly most transparent
to bidders.
In this paper we experimentally investigate bidding behavior in ¯ve di®erent multi{unit
auction formats: the discriminatory auction (DA), the uniform{price sealed{bid auction
(UPS), the uniform{price open auction (UPO), the Vickrey Auction (VA), and the Ausubel
Auction (AA). Our experiment consists of a series of two-unit, two bidder auctions. Bidders
have a °at demand for two units. In this framework, in the most extreme case, demand
reduction in equilibrium involves a zero bid on the second unit in the uniform{price auctions.
This implies a maximum di®erence between the theoretical prediction for the uniform{price
auction and the other auction formats in terms of revenue.
We ¯nd that demand reduction is more frequent in UPO than in UPS, but, interestingly,
does also occur in AA. As a consequence e±ciency is substantially lower in UPO than in
2the other auctions. Demand reduction decreases substantially in AA over time and as a
consequence, e±ciency in AA is signi¯cantly higher than in DA, UPO, and UPS in the
second half of the experiment. Revenue equivalence for the two uniform{price auctions
and for the non{uniform{price auctions, respectively, does not hold. In contrast to the
theoretical prediction, revenues depend less on the pricing rule but rather on whether the
auction is open or sealed{bid and revenues are higher in the latter case. On the one hand,
this is due to the di®erent extent of demand reduction in open and sealed-bid auctions.
On the other hand, ¯rst, bidders more frequently overbid their valuation in VA and UPS
where it is less clear that overbidding is dominated than in the more transparent open
auctions. Second, in DA average bids are frequently above the equilibrium prediction. In
clear contrast to the theoretical prediction, in DA bidders place substantially di®erent bids
on the ¯rst and the second unit, which might be caused by a myopic joy of winning of the
bidders.
In the uniform{price treatments bidders played both, UPO and UPS. Here we found
that even pairs that in UPO coordinated on the payo®-dominant equilibrium involving
complete demand reduction, only rarely managed to do so in the subsequent UPS. We
observe, however, some tendency towards the payo® dominant equilibrium.
Closely related experiments were run by Alsemgeest et al. (1998), Kagel and Levin
(2001), List and Lucking{Reiley (2000), and Porter and Vragov (2006). Our experiments
are, however, the ¯rst to compare all these ¯ve standard auction formats in the same
framework. Alsemgeest et al. (1998) compare UPO and a version of UPS (with a di®erent
pricing rule). They ¯nd that revenue is higher in the sealed bid auction and that bidders
reduce demand in UPO. Kagel and Levin compare uniform{price sealed{bid and open
auctions and the Ausubel auction and ¯nd systematic demand reduction in the uniform{
price auctions. Their subjects also have °at demand for two units but bid against robot
bidders with unit demand. List and Lucking{Reiley conduct ¯eld experiments, comparing
the uniform{price sealed{bid and the Vickrey sealed{bid auction by selling sportscards in
two{unit, two{person auctions. They also ¯nd demand reduction in uniform{price auctions,
compared to Vickrey auctions. They cannot, however, control for the bidders' valuations.
Their experiment is replicated in the laboratory by Porter and Vragov (2006), who ¯nd
substantial deviations from demand revelation in both, UPS and VA, but also more demand
3reduction in UPS.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the equilibria of our auction games
and the implied hypotheses. The experimental design is presented in section 3, followed by
the experimental results in section 4, and the conclusions.
2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
2.1 Equilibria of the Five Auction Formats
We investigate bidding behavior in independent private value auctions with two bidders and
two indivisible identical objects for sale. Each bidder demands at most two units. A bidder
i places the same value vi on each unit. The bidders' valuations are drawn independently
from the same uniform distribution on the interval [0;V ].
We consider ¯ve di®erent auction formats. In the three sealed{bid auctions the bidders
simultaneously submit sealed{bids for each of the units demanded and prices and allocations
are determined according to the auction rules. The two open auctions start out with a price
of zero and active bids on all units demanded. The price is increased and units are traded
according to the rules of the mechanism as bidders drop out. In all auctions the two highest
bids win a unit each.
Uniform{Price Sealed{Bid Auction [UPS] and Uniform{Price Open Auction
[UPO]
Rules. In the uniform{price auctions the price for all units equals the highest rejected bid.
In our experiment, this is the third highest bid. In UPS, each bidder places two bids and
the units are allocated to the two highest bids (or randomly in case of a tie). UPO starts
out with a price of zero, with the price increasing continuously thereafter. Bidders start out
actively bidding on two units each and may choose the price(s) where they drop out on one
unit, or on both. Dropping out is irrevocable so that a bidder can no longer bid on a unit
he has dropped out on. As soon as the number of active bids equals the number of units
available, both items are sold to the bidder(s) holding the active bids at the price at which
4the last bidder dropped out. Thus, the price is determined either by a second dropout of a
bidder on one unit or by a bidder's simultaneous dropout on both units.
Equilibrium. In both uniform{price formats it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid one's
valuation vi on the ¯rst unit1 (i. e. the higher bid always equals the true valuation). The
argument is identical to that for single-unit Vickrey auctions (see, e.g. Vickrey, 1961).
Lowering the bid on the second unit, however, presents a trade-o®. A lower bid on
the second unit lowers the chance of winning two units but, at the same time, may reduce
the price paid for the ¯rst unit. As it turns out, the uniform-price auctions have multiple
equilibria. All equilibria that do not involve truthful bidding on the ¯rst unit are weakly
dominated. Among those equilibria that involve truthful bidding on the ¯rst unit the
following are the extreme cases: Truthful revelation on both units,
b1(vi) = b2(vi) = vi; (1)
(where b1 denotes the ¯rst unit bid and b2 the second unit bid) and full demand reduction
on the second unit such that the bid on the second unit is zero,
b1(vi) = vi; (2)
b2(vi) = 0:
In the following we will refer to these equilibria as the truth{telling (TT) and the demand
reduction (DR) equilibrium, respectively.2 The DR equilibrium payo® dominates all other
equilibria in undominated strategies.
1\First unit" (\second unit") always refers to the unit on which the bidder places the higher (lower)
bid.
2The remaining equilibria in undominated strategies are of the following form: Let K be an integer ¸ 1;
xK+1 = V and [xk;yk), k = 1;:::K be a sequence of non{overlapping intervals with x1 ¸ 0, xk < yk, and






xk if vi 2 [xk;yk);
vi otherwise.
This implies that a bidder bids truthfully if his valuation lies in a truth{telling interval [yk;xk+1) and
partially reduces demand if his valuation lies in a demand reduction interval [xk;yk). The intervals can also
5Discriminatory Auction [DA]
Rules. In the discriminatory auction, the two highest bids win a unit each and the respec-
tive prices equal these bids.
Equilibrium. An important observation in order to derive the optimal strategy is that
with °at demand a bidder places the same bid on both units.3
Thus, the equilibrium bid function on each unit solves maxb F(¾(b))[vi ¡ b], where ¾(b)
is the inverse of the equilibrium strategy bi(v), i = 1;2. In the case of uniformly distributed
valuations on [0;V ] and two bidders the equilibrium bid functions are simply





Rules. In the multi unit generalization of the Vickrey auction the total price a bidder pays
for the units he obtains equals the sum of the bids (other than his own) that are displaced
by his successful bids. In our framework this means that, if one bidder places the two
highest bids, he pays the two bids of the other bidder. If each bidder places one of the two
highest bids, each pays the lower bid of the other bidder because his higher bid displaces
the lower bid of the other bidder.
Equilibrium. In VA it is hence a weakly dominant strategy to bid truthfully on both
units. See Vickrey (1961) for a proof for the general case. We have
b1(vi) = b2(vi) = vi: (4)
Ausubel Auction [AA]
Rules. The Ausubel (or dynamic Vickrey) auction (Ausubel, 2004) is an open mechanism
that implements the same outcome as the multi-unit Vickrey auction in a way that has a
be right-closed. For a proof, see a previous version of this paper, Engelmann and Grimm (2004). These
equilibria do not appear to be very plausible, since it is unclear how subjects could coordinate on any of
them. The TT- and DR- equilibria are clearly focal.
3See Lebrun and Tremblay (2003) for a formal proof of this fact for more general demand functions.
6great potential for transparency to bidders. The auction starts out at a price of zero which
is then increased continuously. In the general case, at any price it is checked for each bidder
whether the aggregate demand of the other bidders is smaller than the available number of
units. If this is the case, the bidder receives the available units at the current price.
In our case, the price is raised until one bidder (say, bidder i) drops out on one unit.
At this point bidder j gets one unit for sure (in other words: he has \clinched" one unit).
This unit is traded immediately and bidder j pays the price at which he has clinched it.
Then the auction continues at this price for the remaining item that is still unsold. From
that point on the two bidders are involved in a single-object English clock auction.
Equilibrium. Under these rules the bidders have an incentive for full demand revelation
on both units since the price paid for the ¯rst unit does not a®ect the price paid for the
other unit. Thus,
b1(vi) = b2(vi) = vi: (5)
This equilibrium is obtained by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. If
one bidder has already dropped out it is weakly dominated to drop out at a price other
than vi, since the dropout price only determines the price for the remaining unit. One
can only lose by staying in above vi and can miss a possible gain by dropping out before
vi is reached. Eliminating these strategies then implies that the price of the ¯rst dropout
does not in°uence the result of the subsequent bidding process. Hence it is also weakly
dominated to drop out ¯rst at a price other than vi since this dropout price only determines
the price for this unit. To make not dropping out at a price lower than vi optimal, however,
requires knowing that the other bidder will not play a dominated strategy (e.g. will not
drop out immediately after). Hence the equilibrium is not in weakly dominant strategies,
but the game is only dominant solvable. The solution concept is thus weaker than in VA.
In contrast the mechanism appears to be more transparent, which might compensate, in
terms of e±ciency, for the weaker equilibrium concept (see also Kagel et al., 2001).
2.2 Hypotheses Derived from the Theory
The theoretical analysis gives us several hypotheses to test.
7(H1) First unit bids in UPO, UPS, AA, and VA should equal the valuation (see section 4.1
for the results).
(H2) Based on the payo®-dominance of the DR-equilibrium over the remaining equilibria
of UPO and UPS, we expect to observe demand reduction on the second unit in the
uniform price autions, at least in some of the pairs. Furthermore, we hypothesize
that the DR{equilibrium is chosen more frequently in UPO than in UPS, since it is
the only equilibrium of UPO that satis¯es certain re¯nements.4 In addition, in UPO
one bidder can initiate it by dropping out on one unit immediately (see section 4.2
for the results).
(H3) In AA, VA, and DA, the bids on both units should be equal (see section 4.3 for the
results).
(H4) In equilibrium, all units should be allocated e±ciently in VA, AA, and DA. In contrast,
only half of the units should be allocated e±ciently if the DR{equilibrium is played
in UPO and UPS, or more generally, not all units should be allocated e±ciently if
(H2) holds (see section 4.4 for the results).
(H5) Revenues are expected to be signi¯cantly lower in the uniform{price auctions than in
the other three auctions (if (H2) holds). Revenues in AA, VA, and DA are theoretically
equivalent in our setting (see section 4.5 for the results).5
(H6) The bidders' expected payo®s are equal in AA, VA, and DA. If (H2) holds, they are
higher in the uniform price auctions and higher in UPO than in UPS (see section 4.6
for the results).
(H7) Bidders are expected to select the DR-equilibrium more often in UPS if they have
played UPO before, i. e. they should manage to transfer the DR they may learn in
4We discuss this in more detail in a previous version of this paper, Engelmann and Grimm (2004).
5In DA, the price for each unit is 1
2 maxfvi;vjg and E[maxfvi;vjg] = 2
3V . In AA and VA the price is
minfvi;vjg and E[minfvi;vjg] = 1
3V , so that the expected revenue is 2
3V in both cases. In contrast, the
expected revenue in the uniform-price auctions is between 0 (if the DR{equilibrium is played) and 2
3V (if
TT is played).
8UPO at least partly to UPS (see section 4.7 for the results).
3 Details of the Experimental Implementation
In each auction the bidders' private valuations for both units were drawn independently
from the uniform distribution on [0;100].6 The bidders were undergraduate students from
Humboldt University Berlin, the University of ZÄ urich, and the ETH ZÄ urich. Pairs of bidders
were randomly formed. In DA, VA and AA each pair played ten auctions under the same
rules. In the uniform{price auctions, in treatment UPOS each pair ¯rst played ten open
auctions and then ten sealed{bid, in treatment UPSO vice versa.7 Apart from this, in
each session only one type of auction was conducted. For each treatment we had ten pairs,
except for treatment DA, where we had nine.
The rationale for the ¯xed matching we employed was twofold. First, there are obvious
practical considerations, namely generating a relatively large number of independent ob-
servations for each of our ¯ve treatments with limited ¯nancial and subject pool resources.
Second, we believe this to be a tougher test than random matching for the expected theo-
retical e±ciency superiority of AA, VA, and DA. We discuss this point in detail in section
4.4. In addition, for many applications, ¯xed matching appears to be the more realistic
model and it is hence interesting to study the susceptibility of the di®erent auction formats
to collusion under repeated interaction.
Subjects were placed at isolated computer terminals, so that they could not determine
whom they formed a pair with. Then the instructions (see appendix A for a translated
sample) were read aloud.8 Before the start of a sequence of ten auctions, subjects played
three dry runs, where they knew that their partner was simulated by a pre-programmed
6Valuations were in fact drawn from the set of integers in [0,100] and also bids were restricted to integers.
7This is why we only played ten auctions per pair and auction type. We wanted the total number of
periods not to exceed 20 to avoid subjects getting bored. We also wanted to keep the incentives in each
auction relatively high with a limited budget.
8This implies that it was common knowledge that the bidders had °at valuations that were drawn
independently from the same distribution.
9strategy.9 In the uniform{price sessions subjects were informed that after the ¯rst ten
auctions, ten further auctions under a di®erent rule would be conducted, without further
details being given at that point. After all pairs had ¯nished the ¯rst ten auctions, the
instructions for the second part were again read aloud.
In the open auction formats the price stayed at 0 for four seconds and then increased
at a rate of 1 per second. Bidders could drop out on one or both (if no bidder had dropped
out before) units at any time. After one bidder dropped out on one unit and the other
bidder was informed about this, the price stayed at the dropout level for four seconds and
increased at a rate of 1 per second thereafter. If a bidder dropped out during these four
seconds, the dropout was regarded as at the same price but later than the ¯rst dropout.
At any time during the bidding process, the bidders could observe the current price, the
number of items for sale and the number of active bids. The sealed{bid auctions were run
in a straightforward way, i. e. both bidders simultaneously placed two bids. Subjects were
informed that the order of the bids was irrelevant.
After each auction bidders were informed about the observed dropout prices in the open
auctions, or all four bids in the sealed{bid auctions, as well as the resulting allocation, their
own gains or losses and their aggregate pro¯ts.
The experimental software was developed in zTree (Fischbacher, 1999). The sessions
lasted for about 60 to 80 minutes in the uniform{price auctions and for about 30 to 50
minutes in the other treatments. At the end of each session, experimental currency units
were exchanged in real currency at a rate of DM 0.04 (Berlin) or CHF 0.04 (ZÄ urich) per
ECU. In addition subjects received DM 5 (Berlin) or CHF10 (ZÄ urich) as show-up fee.10
Average total payo®s were 342 ECU in AA, 270 ECU in DA, 290 ECU in VA, 701 ECU
in UPOS (350 in UPO and 351 in UPS), and 663 ECU in UPSO (312 in UPS and 351
in UPO). This resulted in average earnings (including show-up fees) of DM 25.23 (about
9These pre-programmed strategies did not re°ect any characteristics of the equilibria (in particular
complete demand reduction in the uniform{price auctions) and the subjects were explicitly advised that
they should not see these strategies as examples of a good or a bad strategy.
10In order to relate the earnings, the exchange rates are 1 CHF = 0.65 Euro and 1 DM = 0.51 Euro.
Cost of living is higher in Zurich, which justi¯ed the higher returns. The higher show-up fee in Zurich is
based on a longer average commute to the laboratory than in Berlin.
10EURO 12.90) in Berlin and CHF 27.29 (about EURO 17.75) in Zuerich.
4 Experimental Results
As stated above, in treatments UPOS and UPSO the subjects played both uniform{price
auctions in sequence. For the general comparison of all ¯ve auctions we only consider the
¯rst set of auctions out of these sessions (denoted by UPO and UPS) since the behavior
in the second set of auctions is not independent of the behavior in the ¯rst one. We
analyze behavior in the second set of auctions (denoted by UPsO and UPoS) separately in
subsection 4.7, looking in particular whether bidders move closer to the DR{equilibrium in
the sealed{bid auction if they played the open version ¯rst.
The scatter diagrams in ¯gures 1.1 through 2.4 provide a ¯rst impression of the behavior
of the bidders in the ¯ve di®erent auctions. Figure 1.1. through 1.6 show the bids in the
three di®erent sealed{bid auctions, where \unit1 bids" refers to the (weakly) higher, and
\unit2 bids" to the (weakly) lower bid of a bidder. Figures 2.1 through 2.4 show dropout
prices in the open auctions, AA and UPO. \Double dropouts" are simultaneous dropouts
of one bidder on both units. \First dropouts" are the ¯rst dropout of a bidder on a unit
while \second dropouts" refer to the second dropout in one auction, i. e. the price where
the auction ends, not necessarily to the second dropout of one bidder. While ¯gures 2.1
and 2.3 depict the overall behavior, 2.2 and 2.4 depict the behavior of pairs that almost
followed equilibrium behavior. In what follows we will refer to these ¯gures in order to
illustrate the results.
Below, we generally use non-parametric Mann{Whitney tests for comparisons between
treatments. These are always based on aggregate data per pair. The aggregate is computed
over all periods unless explicitly behavior in only the second ¯ve of the ten auctions is
compared. For comparisons within a treatment (between the ¯rst ¯ve and the second ¯ve
auctions or between the ¯rst and the second set of auctions in UPOS and UPSO), as well
as for comparisons with equilibrium predictions, we generally use non-parametric Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests, because the data are paired. Again the tests are based on aggregate data
per pair.
114.1 Are First-Unit Bids Truthful in VA, UPO, UPS, and AA?
(H1)
Result 1 (First Unit Bids) In AA, UPO, and VA, ¯rst-unit bids generally resemble
truthful bidding. In UPS, overbidding is frequent and substantial.
Bid = Value Bid = Value +/- 1 ECU Bid > Value + 1 ECU
AA 53.0 % * 18.0 % * 11.0 % *
UPO 30.4 % * 21,4 % * 7.1 % *
VA 29.5 % 10.5 % 39.5 %
UPS 21.5 % 13.0 % 33.5 %
Table 1: Percentage of ¯rst unit bids that are equal to the valuation, 1 ECU above or below,
and more than 1 ECU higher than the valuation (*: observable bids).
Table 1 pinpoints the fraction of ¯rst unit bids that were truthful or almost truthful in
the four auction formats. Moreover, it gives information on the extent of overbidding.
Although overbidding is frequent in VA (see the table), in most of these cases, the
degree of overbidding is small so that the average bid exceeds the valuation only slightly
(0.78 ECU) and insigni¯cantly (p = 0:333).
In contrast, in UPS overbidding is substantial (see Table 1). The average bid exceeds the
valuation considerably (5.55 ECU) which just fails to be signi¯cant (p = 0:114; Wilcoxon
signed-rank test). Two additional observations in UPS are interesting in this context: First,
out of 72 instances where bidders overbid on at least the ¯rst unit, only 11 led to a loss for
the bidder. This illustrates quite well that bidders in UPS hardly learn that overbidding is
dominated. Moreover | quite surprisingly | only in one case a bidder revised his behavior
after su®ering a loss.
In UPO and AA bidders underbid their valuation on the ¯rst unit more frequently
than they overbid. Relative underbidding on the ¯rst unit was not signi¯cantly di®erent
from 0 in AA (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0:76), but was signi¯cant in UPO (p =
120:012).11 Moreover, relative underbidding was signi¯cantly larger in UPO than in AA
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:016).
4.2 Demand Reduction in UPO/UPS (H2)
Result 2 (Demand Reduction) Complete demand reduction occurs frequently in UPO,
but only rarely in UPS.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show dropout prices in UPO.12 Figure 2.4 shows that in three pairs
both bidders almost always dropped out on one unit at price 0, independently of their
valuation.13 These three pairs almost played the DR{equilibrium strategy, while the other
subjects either bid roughly consistent with the TT{equilibrium or do not seem to have
followed a consistent strategy. In the DR{equilibrium rational behavior implies that even
o® the equilibrium path, whenever one bidder drops out on one unit, the other should
immediately follow. This requirement was violated in 55 % of the observable cases.
Figure 1.2 shows the (weakly) lower bids in UPS (\unit2 bids"). As expected we observe
substantially fewer cases of complete demand reduction. In particular, we observed only 9
zero{bids on the second unit (from bidders with positive valuations) in UPS, which were
all placed by the same subject, while we observed 33 such bids in UPO (notably, in UPO,
the number of zero bids increases from 12 in periods 1 to 5 to 21 in periods 6 to 10).14
The number of zero{bids is signi¯cantly higher in UPO than in UPS (Mann{Whitney test,
p = 0:085). In UPS, only one subject consistently chose the TT{equilibrium strategy, which
11In UPO and AA, we can observe ¯rst-unit bids only in a subset of auctions. We refer to shares of the
observable bids here.
12Recall that \second dropouts" refer to the second dropout in one auction, that is, the price where the
auction ends, not necessarily to the second dropout of one bidder.
13Note that for the open auctions we can only include the observed bids in the Figures. For the unobserved
bids, a lower threshold is given by the price at which the auction ended. Hence, the ¯gures for the open
auctions should not be directly compared to those for the sealed{bid auctions, because the latter show all
bids, whereas the former show only the two lowest bids in each auction.
14In addition, there were 15 bids equal to 1 (by bidders with valuations larger than 1) in UPO, but only
4 in UPS.
13was, however, not part of an equilibrium either, since the other subject was underbidding
on the second unit most of the time.
4.3 Equality of Bids and Bid Spreads (H3)
According to the equilibrium prediction, in AA, VA, and DA the bidders should place equal
bids on both units. In this section, we study the deviation from this prediction and also
compare it to the bid spreading in UPS, where this is consistent with equilibrium behavior.
Result 3 (Bid Spreading) (i) Bid spreads are small in AA and VA.
(ii) In sharp contrast with the equilibrium prediction, they are substantial and persistent
in DA, and of similar magnitude in UPS.
maxbid-minbid UPO UPS AA VA DA
= 0 27%¤ 18% 64%¤ 49% 12%
< 10% Equ. 43%¤ 34% 68%¤ 62% 15%
¸ 40% Equ. 32%¤ 33% 18%¤ 14% 49%
Table 2: Share of bid pairs (*: of observable bid pairs) that are exactly equal, where the
di®erence is smaller than 10, or larger than 40 percent.
In both AA and VA several subjects played exactly according to the equilibrium pre-
diction. In AA, some bidders initially tried to cooperate by placing one extremely low bid,
however, those attempts usually did not work out and were abandoned after a few rounds.
For VA, the data for the individual bidders reveal that the hypothesis that both, the higher
and the lower bid are drawn from the same distribution can be rejected at the 5% level for
only 4 out of 20 bidders (Kolmogorov{Smirnov test). Equal bids in all 10 auctions were
placed by 4 out of 20 bidders. Bid spreading decreased signi¯cantly over time according to
a linear regression (with robust standard errors).
The most surprising result is obtained for DA, where according to the theoretical pre-
diction, bid spreads should not occur. In sharp contrast, however, bids spreads were at
14the highest level among all treatments. First-unit bids were signi¯cantly higher (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test p = 0:021) than the equilibrium bid while the average second-unit bid was
(insigni¯cantly) smaller than the equilibrium bid (p = 0:139). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
shows that the hypothesis that both, the higher and the lower bids (relative to equilibrium
bids) are drawn from the same distribution, can be rejected at the 5%-level for 12 out of
18 bidders. Hence, bid spreading (relative to equilibrium bids) was clearly more prominent
in DA than in VA (Mann-Whitney p = 0:0025). We discuss possible explanations for this
phenomenon in a companion paper (Grimm and Engelmann, 2005). There we reject risk
aversion as explanation and ¯nd support rather in favor of a joy of winning. In UPS, where
it is consistent with the DR-equilibrium bid spreading (relative to equilibrium bids) was
clearly larger than in VA (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:0082), but indistinguishable from that
in DA (p = 0:807).
4.4 E±ciency (H4)
Result 4 (Efficiency) (i) Due to demand reduction, e±ciency is lower in UPO than
in the other auction formats, that do not di®er substantially in terms of e±ciency.
(ii) E±ciency increases signi¯cantly over time in AA and hence in periods 6 to 10, e±-
ciency in AA is signi¯cantly higher than in DA, UPO, and UPS.
In equilibrium both units are allocated to the bidder with the higher valuation in AA,
VA, and DA, but only one unit in the DR{equilibrium of the uniform-price auctions. An
e±cient allocation requires allocating both units to the bidder with the higher valuation,
because independent of the price this maximizes social welfare (the sum of the bidders'
pro¯ts and the auctioneer's revenue).
Because valuations are randomly and independently drawn in our experiment, simply
comparing treatments with respect to the achieved total welfare would be biased by these
random draws. We compare the auction formats with respect to three di®erent e±ciency
measures that are aimed to minimize this bias:
² Allocative E±ciency: the number of e±ciently allocated units (i. e. to the bidder with
the higher valuation) relative to the total number of units.
15² Relative E±ciency Loss: the loss in terms of total welfare relative to the maximum
possible e±ciency loss.
² Relative E±ciency: the achieved total welfare relative to maximum possible welfare.
Allocative e±ciency does not re°ect the actual magnitude of e±ciency losses due to mis-
allocations. If the \wrong" bidder obtains a unit, his valuation may be substantially or
only slightly below the other bidder's valuation, causing either dramatic or small welfare
losses. Our second and third measures take this into account. In Table 3 we report for each
measure aggregate results over all pairs and periods, as well as separated into the ¯rst ¯ve
periods and the second ¯ve periods.15
Concerning allocative e±ciency over all periods, treatments do not di®er much. None
of the pair-wise di®erences is signi¯cant (Mann-Whitney, p > 0:2). In particular, in UPS
the allocative e±ciency was only slightly below that in AA, DA, and VA, although the
predicted allocative e±ciency in the DR{equilibrium is only half of that predicted in the
three other auctions. In each of AA, VA, and UPS for exactly one pair all units were
allocated e±ciently. The low allocative e±ciency in UPO is due to the coordination of
some pairs on the DR{equilibrium. According to relative e±ciency losses and relative
e±ciency, in UPO e±ciency is (marginally) signi¯cantly lower than in both AA (Mann-
Whitney, p = 0:059 resp. p = 0:041) and DA (p = 0:086 resp. p = 0:06).
Di®erences in e±ciency are far more pronounced in the second ¯ve periods (see again
Table 3). E±ciency increases over time are substantial only in DA, VA, and AA, and
signi¯cant only in AA.16 Indeed, e±ciency in AA in the last ¯ve periods is signi¯cantly
higher than in DA, UPO, and UPS.17 None of the other treatments di®er signi¯cantly at a
15Aggregates are not averages over the relative measures, but relative measures computed with respect
to aggregate data. For example, relative e±ciency for one treatment corresponds to the total achieved
welfare by all pairs in this treatment over all (respectively the ¯rst or second ¯ve) periods, divided by the
aggregated maximum possible welfare. This minimizes the impact of outliers based on small valuations.
16p = 0:039; p = 0:011; and p = 0:025 (Wilcoxon signed-rank) for allocative e±ciency, relative e±ciency
loss and relative e±ciency, respectively; in all other treatments p > 0:2 with respect to each measure.
17For the comparison with DA we get p = 0:054; and p = 0:045 for relative e±ciency loss and relative
e±ciency, respectively; with UPO we have p = 0:073; p = 0:008; and p = 0:011 for allocative e±ciency,
16Periods allocative e®. relative e®. loss relative e®.
all 84 % 9.2 % 95.6 %
AA 1 { 5 77 % 18 % 91.4 %
6 { 10 91 % 0.8 % 99.6 %
all 82.5 % 13.8 % 93.3 %
VA 1 { 5 77 % 16.8 % 92.4 %
6 { 10 88 % 11.1 % 94.2 %
all 83.3 % 7.1 % 96.5 %
DA 1 { 5 81.1 % 9.8 % 95.3 %
6 { 10 85.5 % 4.5 % 97.8 %
all 81 % 12.2 % 92.9 %
UPS 1 { 5 80 % 11.5 % 93.5 %
6 { 10 82 % 12.9 % 92.2 %
all 74 % 25.9 % 87.6 %
UPO 1 { 5 72 % 25.8 % 88.5 %
6 { 10 76 % 25.9 % 86.6 %
Table 3: E±ciency, measured by allocative e±ciency, relative e±ciency loss, and relative
e±ciency.
1710% level with respect to any e±ciency measure in periods 6 to 10.
A more detailed look at the e±ciency losses in AA reveals two main underlying reasons
for ine±cient allocations. First, attempts to collude by demand reduction or by dropping
at price 0 with both units in the case of low valuations, apparently with the hope of
reciprocation in later periods. Second, situations where the valuations of both bidders
were very close, so that small deviations from the equilibrium strategy could result in
misallocations. Since attempts to collude are largely unsuccessful, misallocations due to
the ¯rst reason have disappeared in the second half of the experiment. The remaining
misallocations all lead to very small losses in terms of welfare. Consequently, whereas
allocative e±ciency reaches only 91 %, according to the two measures that account for the
magnitude of e±ciency losses, AA reaches almost perfect e±ciency in the last ¯ve periods.
In contrast, in all other mechanisms, even in periods 6 to 10, the relative e±ciency loss
is larger than 4% and the relative e±ciency below 98 %. The only auction format where
allocative e±ciency also increases substantially over time is VA. However, in contrast to
AA, in VA it is not the misallocations with substantial e±ciency losses that disappear over
time. Hence while according to our overall results, none of the mechanisms appears to
be clearly preferable in terms of e±ciency, AA clearly is preferable in case of experienced
bidders.
The disappearance of misallocations due to collusive attempts also suggests that AA
would have proved superior in terms of e±ciency if we had conducted more periods or with
random matching, which makes collusion less likely. In UPO, in contrast, under random
matching, one bidder might teach a series of other bidders the DR{equilibrium. Hence we
suspect that the advantage of AA over UPO with respect to e±ciency would even be larger
under random matching than under ¯xed matching, so that the ¯xed matching employed
in our experiment is a tougher test for the e±ciency superiority of AA.
While e±ciency also increases (though not signi¯cantly) over time in DA (and is second
highest with respect to relative e±ciency in periods 6 to 10), the misallocations in DA
were primarily caused by bid spreading, a robust e®ect in most pairs (indeed it increases
from the ¯rst ¯ve to the second ¯ve periods in ¯ve out of nine pairs). The increase in e±-
relative e±ciency loss and relative e±ciency, respectively; and with UPS, p = 0:085; p = 0:004; and
p = 0:004 (same order, Wilcoxon signed-rank).
18ciency appears to be due primarily to the reduction in erratic behavior, but the remaining
misallocations due to bid spreading are likely to persist even in experiments over substan-
tially more periods. We suspect that increasing the number of bidders would emphasize
the advantage of AA over DA. On the one hand, underbidding in attempts to cooperate is
likely to decrease in AA for more than two bidders. On the other hand, if bid spreading
in DA prevails for more bidders, the probability that ¯rst unit bids of bidders with low
valuation are higher than second unit bids of bidders with high valuation (and hence for
misallocations) increases in the number of bidders.
4.5 Auctioneer's Revenues (H5)
Result 5 (Revenue) (i) Revenue equivalence is rejected for AA and DA, and it is also
clearly rejected for the uniform-price auctions.
(ii) Revenues are generally higher in sealed-bid than in open auctions.
% of Eq. Revenue min %ER max %ER
UPO 68.97 % 1.30 % 107.82 %
AA 84.74 % 43.73 % 115.55 %
VA 95.58 % 41.45 % 130.73 %
UPS 106.74 % 80.48 % 160.67 %
DA 110.72 % 83.13 % 145.29 %
Table 4: Percentage of (TT) Equilibrium Revenue (%ER) reached in the di®erent auctions.
Min and max refer to the minimum and maximum among the aggregates per pair.
The theoretical results predict equal expected revenues in equilibrium for VA, DA and
AA. The empirical revenues (see Table 4), however, do not re°ect this. The di®erence
in revenues relative to the equilibrium revenue between AA and DA is signi¯cant (Mann-
Whitney test, p = 0:034), but both do not di®er signi¯cantly from the equilibrium18 or
18Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0:139 for DA and p = 0:203 for AA.
19from VA.19
In the uniform{price auctions the (DR{) equilibrium revenues are 0. The empirical rev-
enues were naturally higher. To compare the revenues in the two uniform{price auctions,
in Table 4 we report revenues relative to the TT{equilibrium revenues (which equal the
expected equilibrium revenues in the other three auction formats). The di®erence between
UPO and UPS is substantial and signi¯cant (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:019). Further-
more, the revenues were signi¯cantly smaller than in TT{equilibrium in UPO but not in
UPS (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p = 0:028 and p = 0:507, respectively). Thus revenue
equivalence, which would be implied if the same equilibrium is played in both auction for-
mats, does not hold for the two uniform{price auctions either. This is, of course, consistent
with result 2 that demand reduction is more frequent in UPO than in UPS. In line with
the equilibrium prediction the relative revenues in UPO were signi¯cantly lower than in VA
and DA (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:070 and p = 0:006; respectively), but the di®erence is not
signi¯cant with respect to AA (p = 0:290).
4.6 Bidder Payo®s (H6)
Result 6 (Bidder Payoffs) (i) In UPO and UPS bidder payo®s are signi¯cantly
lower than the DR-equilibrium prediction.
(ii) In DA, bidder payo®s are signi¯cantly lower than in equilibrium, in UPO, and in AA.
% DR{Eq. Bidder Pro¯ts min % DR{EBP max % DR{EBP
UPS 68.75 % 50.93 % 87.89 %
UPO 67.83 % 37.93 % 102.25 %
Table 5: Percentage of (DR) Equilibrium Bidder Payo®s (% DR{EBP) reached in UPO
and UPS. Min and max refer to the minimum and maximum among the aggregates per
pair.
19Mann-Whitney, p = 0:545 for AA and p = 0:165 for DA.
20%Eq. Bidder Pro¯ts min %EBP max %EBP
AA 107.40 % 54.26 % 288.83 %
VA 90.88 % 43.36 % 164.01 %
DA 82.37 % 47.00 % 113.04 %
UPS 83.02 % 57.73 % 112.04 %
UPO 108.02 % 80.06 % 149.53 %
Table 6: Percentage of (TT{) Equilibrium Bidder Payo®s (%EBP) reached in the di®erent
auctions. Min and max refer to the minimum and maximum among the aggregates per
pair.
Bidder pro¯ts in both, UPS and UPO, were signi¯cantly lower than the DR{equilibrium
pro¯ts (see Table 5, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0:007 in UPO, p = 0:005 in UPS). In
UPS pro¯ts were even lower than the TT{equilibrium pro¯ts (Table 6, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, p = 0:059) and pro¯ts relative to the TT{equilibrium payo®s were signi¯cantly
smaller in UPS than in UPO (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:034).20
In AA, attempts to collude during the ¯rst periods of the experiment resulted in payo®s
that exceeded equilibrium payo®s in ¯ve pairs. However, average bidder pro¯ts are not sig-
ni¯cantly di®erent from the equilibrium prediction (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0:445).
The extreme minimum and maximum pro¯ts (see Table 6) were partly a coincidence.21
20The comparison between UPS and UPO yields di®erent results depending on which equilibrium is used
as a benchmark because the valuations were randomly drawn and hence di®erent in the two treatments.
21For the "lucky" pair (that achieved 289% of equilibrium payo®s), in several auctions the valuations
of both bidders in this pair were very close, so that the equilibrium payo®s were very small. Attempts to
cooperate through demand reduction or generous dropping out at a low price with both units led to payo®s
substantially above the equilibrium. The low bidder pro¯ts of 54% of equilibrium pro¯ts were also partly
driven by a chance event. In this pair, the same bidder always had the lower valuation. This seems to have
caused some frustration which resulted in overbidding, which may have been driven by spite or just by a
desire to experiment. The other pairs' payo®s ranged from 91% to 138%.
21In VA bidder pro¯ts are not signi¯cantly di®erent from the equilibrium prediction
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0:203). For most pairs, pro¯ts were close to the equi-
librium, with four pairs within 5% deviation of the equilibrium pro¯ts.
In DA, since average bids were above equilibrium, bidder pro¯ts were consistently lower
than the equilibrium prediction in most pairs. Seven out of nine pairs were below 90% of the
equilibrium pro¯ts. Bidder pro¯ts in DA were signi¯cantly lower than equilibrium pro¯ts
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0:028). Furthermore, pro¯ts in DA were signi¯cantly lower
than in UPO (relative to the TT{equilibrium) and AA (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:028 and
p = 0:041, respectively).
4.7 E®ects UPO $ UPS (H7)
We have seen above that the subjects learn to play the payo® dominant DR{equilibrium
of the uniform{price auction better in the open version. They might, however, be able to
transfer the demand reduction they learn in UPO to UPS, whereas playing UPS before UPO
should not help them ¯nding the DR-equilibrium in UPO. In order to check whether this
intuition is right, we let the subjects who played UPO and UPS play another ten auctions
in the other uniform{price format. We will refer to the ten open auctions that were played
after the sealed{bid auctions as UPsO and to the sealed{bid auctions played after the open
auctions as UPoS.
Result 7 (i) Bidders who have played UPO ¯rst, play closer to the DR-equilibrium in
the sealed-bid auction than those in UPS. They exhibit, however, less DR than they
previously did in UPO.
(ii) There appear to be slight hysteresis e®ects for bidders who ¯rst play UPS and then the
open auction. They exhibit less demand reduction than those who started with UPO.
Three of the pairs that played UPO ¯rst cooperated almost from the start and continued
to do so until the end of the open auctions. While those pairs realized roughly the DR{
equilibrium pro¯t most of the time in UPO, this did not carry over to the subsequent
sealed{bid auctions with the same pricing rule.
22% TT{Eq. Revenue min % TT{ER max % TT{ER
UPS 106.74 % 80.48 % 160.67 %
UPoS 71.33 % 6.5 % 128.28 %
UPO 68.97 % 1.30 % 107.82 %
UPsO 80.22 % 34.15 % 102.37 %
Table 7: Percentage of (TT{) Equilibrium Revenues (% TT{ER) reached in UPoS and
UPsO. Min and max refer to the minimum and maximum among the aggregates per pair.
% DR{Eq. Bidder Pro¯ts min % DR{EBP max % DR{EBP
UPS 68.75 % 50.93 % 87.89 %
UPoS 71.03 % 39.5 % 109.12 %
UPO 67.83 % 37.93 % 102.25 %
UPsO 69.71 % 34.96 % 96.66 %
Table 8: Percentage of (DR{) Equilibrium Bidder Payo®s (% DR{EBP) reached in UPO,
UPS, UPoS, and UPsO. Min and max refer to the minimum and maximum among the
aggregates per pair.
23Whereas there is no signi¯cant di®erence in the bidder pro¯ts relative to the DR{
equilibrium between UPS and UPoS (see also Table 8), the auctioneer's revenue relative
to the TT-equilibrium was much lower in UPoS than in UPS (see Table 7, Mann-Whitney
test, p = 0:013). In UPoS revenue was also signi¯cantly lower than in the TT{equilibrium
(Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p = 0:047). Furthermore, e±ciency was signi¯cantly lower in
UPoS than in UPS (allocative e±ciency 67.5% vs. 81%).22 In addition, the number of ex-
tremely low (0 or 1) bids was signi¯cantly higher in UPoS than in UPS (Mann-Whitney test,
p = 0:047). These results indicate that behavior got closer to playing the DR{equilibrium
in the sealed-bid auction if the open auction was played ¯rst. The truthfulness of ¯rst unit
bids (see Table 9), as well as the aggregate bid spread, however, do not di®er signi¯cantly
between UPS and UPoS.
High Bid = Value High Bid = Value +/- 1 Low Bid 2 f0;1g
UPsO 46.7 % * 25.0 % * 36
UPO 30.4 % * 21.4 % * 48
UPoS 21.0 % 10.5 % 36
UPS 21.5 % 13.0 % 13
Table 9: Percentage of ¯rst unit bids in the four uniform price autions that are equal to
the valuation, and 1 ECU above or below the valuation and percentage of second unit bids
that are extremely low (0 or 1) (*: observable bids).
For the pairs that played UPS ¯rst and then UPsO most of the evidence is in line with
the hypothesis that the DR{equilibrium is easier to learn in the open than in the sealed-
bid format. Bidder pro¯ts relative to the DR{equilibrium in UPsO were on average close
to those in UPO (see Table 8). Bidder pro¯ts relative to the TT{equilibrium increased
signi¯cantly from UPS to UPsO (p = 0:028; Wilcoxon signed-rank test), as did the number
of extremely low (0 or 1) bids on the second unit (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0:079),
22The di®erence is signi¯cant according to Mann-Whitney tests p = 0:031 for allocative e±ciency, p =
0:049 for relative e±ciency loss, p = 0:096 and for relative e±ciency. Interestingly, the allocative e±ciency
was even slightly (but insigni¯cantly) lower in UPoS than in UPO.
24while the auctioneer's revenues decreased signi¯cantly (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p =
0:013). On the other hand, di±culties in coordinating on the DR-equilibrium in UPS
seems to have partially carried over to UPsO. For example, the number of extremely low
bids is smaller than in UPO, while e±ciency and auctioneer's revenues are higher (though
none of these results is statistically signi¯cant). The allocative e±ciency in UPsO is even
larger than in UPoS (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:072) opposite to the e±ciency comparison
between UPS and UPO. Finally, bidders violated the requirement of the DR{equilibrium
to drop out on one unit immediately once the other bidder had dropped out, more often
in UPsO (66 % of the cases where it was possible). In UPO, it was violated in only 55 %
of the cases. This does not seem to be attributable to a lower rationality of the bidders in
UPsO than in UPO, because truthful bidding on the ¯rst unit was more frequent in UPsO
than in UPO (see Table 9).23
4.8 Questionnaires
In all treatments there were participants who indicated in post{experimental questionnaires
that they tried to cooperate, as well as participants who explicitly behaved competitively
or even spiteful. There is no indication that subjects realized that demand reduction is an
equilibrium in the uniform-price auctions. In the uniform-price auctions as well as in the
Vickrey and Ausubel auctions, several subjects realized that complete demand reduction is
(weakly) payo® dominating all (other) equilibria and some realized that in UPO cooperation
is easier than in UPS, while none made an explicit reference to equilibrium logic. Many
subjects cited avoiding losses as a primary aim or as a constraint on their attempts to
maximize their payo®s.
23Alsemgeest et al. (1998) ¯nd similar hysteresis e®ects in open auctions. Subjects who play the open
auction with multi-unit demand after playing the open auction with single unit demand exhibit substantially
less demand reduction than those who played the multi-unit demand auction ¯rst.
255 Conclusion
The results of our experiments are in line with some of the theoretical predictions, while
they clearly contradict others. Demand reduction occurs in the uniform-price auctions,
though it also does to a lesser extent in the Ausubel auction. The allocative e±ciency is
lowest in UPO, and highest in AA, where the latter di®ers only slightly from UPS, VA,
and DA over all periods with respect to the number of e±ciently allocated units, but the
causes of misallocations appear to be least robust in AA. As a consequence, e±ciency is
signi¯cantly higher in AA than in DA, UPO, and UPS in the second half of the experiment.
The revenue equivalence of AA and DA is clearly rejected, as it is for the two uniform-price
auctions. In clear contrast to the theory, the auctioneer's revenues do not primarily depend
on the pricing-rule, but whether the auction is open or sealed{bid.
Some of the results do not come as a surprise, though not predicted by the equilibrium
analysis. Overbidding is more frequent in UPS and in VA than in UPO and AA, apparently
since in the sealed{bid auctions it is less clear that overbidding is dominated. Coordination
on the DR{equilibrium seems to be much easier in UPO than in UPS, because one bidder
can signal by dropping out. Bidding above the equilibrium strategy is much more frequent
in DA than in VA, and in particular in AA, since in the latter cases this involves overbidding
of the valuation, and it is easier to recognize that this is not optimal, than it is to calculate
the optimal bids in DA. These behavioral e®ects cause the auctioneer's revenues to be
higher in the sealed{bid auctions than in the open auctions.
Our primary results are qualitatively in line with those of Kagel and Levin (2001),
though some di®erences apparently result from our design involving two human players.
They also ¯nd more demand reduction in the uniform{price open auction than in the
uniform{price sealed{bid auction. However, while they ¯nd much less demand reduction
in the Ausubel auction, we ¯nd more extremely low bids in early stages of AA than in
UPS. Apparently these extremely low bids were the results of attempts to collude, which
is impossible in their design with simulated opponents.
In accordance with our results, Kagel and Levin (2001) also ¯nd much more overbid-
ding in the uniform{price sealed{bid auction than in the two open auctions. Furthermore,
in their experiment as well as in ours UPS yields higher revenues to the auctioneer but
26lower allocative e±ciency than AA, although the di®erence in e±ciency is smaller in our
experiment, again probably resulting from attempts to collude in AA (in the second half
of our experiment, when attempts to collude have ceased, e±ciency is substantially and
signi¯cantly larger in AA than in UPS). Hence we provide some further indication for this
theoretically unanticipated trade-o® between revenue and e±ciency in AA and UPS. Thus,
their main results do not seem to depend critically on the simulation of other participants
by computers, although the superior performance of the Ausubel auction seems to be weak-
ened in our interactive environment. In contrast to Kagel and Levin, in our experiment
there seems to be surprisingly little learning both within and across auction rules (with the
exception of AA where bidders learn that collusion does not work). Those subjects who
manage to determine the equilibrium do so almost at once. This is particularly surprising
given that our interactive environments seem to be more complicated and that we did not
provide hints against overbidding.
In line with our observation that the pricing-rule is less important for revenues than
whether the auction is sealed{bid or open, List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) ¯nd little di®er-
ences in revenues between VA and UPS. They also ¯nd more overbidding on the ¯rst unit
in UPS compared to VA, as we do.24 Our results also con¯rm the observation of List and
Lucking-Reiley that the bid spreading is larger in UPS than in VA, and con¯rm that this
leads to (slightly) more misallocations.
What is surprising, though, in our experiment, is that bid spreading is very strong in
DA, where it is not consistent with equilibrium behavior. This seems to be caused by a
myopic joy of winning which leads subjects to increase the probability of acquiring at least
one unit at the expense of expected pro¯ts. This phenomenon has no distorting e®ect in
the other auction mechanisms, since the probability of acquiring at least one unit (without
making losses) is maximized by bidding the valuation on the ¯rst unit, consistent with
equilibrium behavior. We discuss the consequences of this observation in more detail in
a companion paper (Grimm and Engelmann 2005), where we argue that our data raise
doubts about the explanatory adequacy of risk aversion in accounting for overbidding in
24In a related experiment, Engelbrecht-Wiggans, List and Reiley (2004), ¯nd that this e®ect disappears
with 3 or 5 bidders. They also ¯nd, consistent with the theoretical prediction, that demand reduction is
still present, but reduced if the number of bidders is increased.
27single unit auctions as well.
Another observation is that the total allocative e±ciency is almost identical in VA and
AA. Ine±cient allocations in AA seem partially caused by bidders hoping that the second
bidder will play the weakly dominated strategy of dropping out after a dropout of the ¯rst
bidder (which the second bidder then sometimes does), whereas ine±cient allocations in VA
result from a higher number of bids that deviate from the valuation, though only slightly.
The latter observation may possibly be due to the fact that in VA it is less transparent to
the bidders that bidding their own valuation is dominant. Hence we ¯nd that the possibly
more transparent mechanism in AA can compensate for the weaker equilibrium concept
compared to VA, a ¯nding in agreement with the results in Kagel et al. (2001). After some
experience, though, the collusive attempts in AA are given up and e±ciency is higher than
in VA.
One interesting detail in our experiment is that statements in the post-experimental
questionnaires are similar after the uniform-price auctions and after AA. Several partici-
pants tried to cooperate by reducing demand and they observed that this worked well in
UPO, but less so in UPS and even less in AA. It seems, however, that they all failed to
realize that cooperation was stable when it was an equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium
prediction organizes the data well for some pairs although the subjects do not think in
these terms. This is, of course, interesting from a general perspective. Equilibria can yield
good predictions even if they are possibly too sophisticated for subjects to determine, given
that equilibrium choices can result from less sophisticated thought processes.
Finally, there are some policy conclusions to be drawn from the research. If the objective
of the auctioneer is a combination of the maximization of e±ciency and of his revenues,
the uniform{price open auction is clearly not preferable. Demand reduction leads both to
a reduction of revenues and to a misallocation of one unit.25 If the primary aim is the
25Goswami, Noe, and Rebello (1996) ¯nd that in a setting with a high number of bidders (11) and units
(100) and identical valuations, in a uniform-price sealed{bid auction non{binding pre{play communication
facilitates demand reduction whereas it shifts behavior towards the equilibrium in a discriminatory auction.
This indicates that outside the laboratory, where communication is more likely, the di®erences with respect
to e±ciency between uniform-price and other auction formats may be stronger than in our (and others')
results.
28e±cient allocation, AA seems to be best suited, in particular if bidders have time to gain
experience, while if the focus is on revenues, the sealed{bid auctions perform best due to
frequent overbidding in UPS and to bids generally exceeding equilibrium bids in DA. A
mechanism that is easy to understand seems best suited to allocate the units e±ciently,
while a sealed{bid mechanism where bids have to be determined completely unaware of the
other bidders' choices may raise higher revenues.
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A Instructions (Ausubel Auction) | Not for Publi-
cation
Please read these instructions carefully. If there is something you do not understand,
please raise your hand. We will then answer your questions privately. The instructions are
identical for all participants.
In the course of the experiment you will participate in 10 auctions. In each auction you
and another bidder will bid for two units of a ¯ctitious good. This other bidder will be
the same in each auction. Each unit that you acquire will be sold to the experimenters for
your private resale value v. Before each auction this value per unit, v, will be randomly
drawn independently for each bidder from the interval 0 · v · 100 ECU (Experimental
Currency Unit). Any number between 0 and 100 is equally probable. The private resale
values of di®erent bidders are independent. In each auction any unit that you acquire
will have the same value for you. This value will be drawn anew before each
auction.
Before each auction you will be informed about your resale value per unit, v. Each
participant will be informed only about his or her own resale value, but not about the other
bidder's resale value.
After a short break the auction starts:
The price per unit will be increased successively in steps of 1, beginning at a price
of 0. At the beginning of the auction you are active on both units. At any time you can
drop out on one unit by clicking the button \dropout 1" or you can drop out on both units
simultaneously by clicking the button \dropout 2".
31If one of the bidders clicks the button \dropout 2", the other bidder obtains both units
for the price where the ¯rst bidder dropped out and the auction is ¯nished (since then there
are only two active bids left).
If one bidder drops out on one unit, the other immediately obtains one unit (since the
¯rst bidder has only one active bid left and can thus acquire at most one unit) for the price
at which the ¯rst bidder dropped out.
Then the auction continues at the price at which the ¯rst unit was given away. Now
only one unit is auctioned o® and both bidders have only one active bid. If now one bidder
drops out on this unit, the other bidder obtains this unit for the price at which the bidder
dropped out and the auction is ¯nished.
If upon reaching the maximal price of 100 ECU there are four active bids left, both
bidders receive one unit for a price of 100 ECU. If upon reaching the maximal price of 100
ECU there is only one unit given away, (both bidders still have one active bid), then the
other unit will be randomly allocated for a price of 100 ECU among the two bidders.
Your pro¯t per unit acquired is your resale value minus the price at which you obtained
the unit.
If you do not obtain a unit you neither receive nor pay anything. Hence your pro¯t is
0.
Note that you can make losses as well. It is always possible, however, to bid in such a
way that you can prevent losses for sure.
You will make your decision via the computer terminal. You will not get to know the
names and code numbers of the other participants. Thus all decisions remain con¯dential.
One ECU corresponds to 0,04 DM. You will obtain an initial endowment of 5 DM. If
you make losses in an auction these will be deducted from your previous gains (or from your
initial endowment). You will receive your ¯nal pro¯t in cash at the end of the experiment.
The other participants will not get to know your pro¯ts.
If there is something you have not understood, please raise your hand. We will then
answer your questions privately.
32Scatter Diagrams, Sealed-Bid Auctions
Figure 1.1




















































































































































sScatter Diagrams - Open Auctions
Figure 2.1
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